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Glossary 
AMS – Agricultural Marketing Service; part of the USDA that provides price and quantity data for 
agricultural commodities 
ATOs – alternative trade organizations 
CAFOs – Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations; a commonality of conventional animal product 
production in which animals are tightly confined in a large industrial facility 
Corporate actors/Industry actors – used interchangeably to describe large firms that are partnered with 
Fair Trade/Organic  
Equal Exchange – the first activist Fair Trade coffee roaster 
fair trade – refers to the general fair trade movement designed to pay farmers better prices for 
commodities 
Fair Trade – refers to Fair Trade USA (or Transfair USA prior to 2011 when noted) 
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Fair-washing – using the FT label to “burnish their corporate images and mislead consumers about their 
overall business practices, without meaningfully altering those practices” (Jaffee 2012, p. 107). 
FLO – refers to Fairtrade International (Previously Fair Labeling Organizations International) 
FT – acronym used to refer to Fair Trade USA 
Just Coffee – an activist coffee company that purchases coffee directly from fair trade cooperatives 
Max Havelaar – one of the first activist groups that started fair trade 
National List – short for National List of Allowed and Prohibited Substances; a list of synthetic and 
nonorganic materials allowed and prohibited in organic production 
NOP – National Organic Program; administers Organic within the United States Department of 
Agriculture 
NOSB – National Organic Standards Board; recommends standards to the NOP for USDA Organic 
Organic – refers to USDA Organic 
organic – refers to the general organic movement to produce agriculture without the use of synthetic 
materials 
Organic Consumer’s Association – an activist consumer group dedicated to preserving the integrity of 
USDA Organic 
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture 
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Abstract 
Fair Trade and Organic initiatives both represent new forms of social and ethical regulation that 
attempt to charge a higher price for a more ethically or environmentally beneficial product. Started by 
activist movements, each initiative has seen increased brand visibility and product awareness as their 
products fill new consumer niches for ethical or environmentally-beneficial products. As a result of each 
initiatives success in expensive niche markets, corporate and industry actors have partnered with these 
initiatives to manufacture ethical products. However, partnership with corporate and industry actors 
runs the risk of diluting the initiatives to little more than conventional production, as corporate actors 
share fundamentally different values and priorities than the activists who created each movement. As a 
result, both Fair Trade and Organic have faced pressure from corporate actors to dilute their initiatives 
to little more than conventional production. Since Fair Trade is privately regulated and Organic is 
publicly regulated, it appears that the nature of private and public regulatory bodies could cause them 
to respond to pressures from corporate actors differently.  Using the theoretical concepts of Regulatory 
Capture and the Life Cycle Theory of Regulatory Commissions, I will present controversial standards 
within each initiative and determine that Fair Trade has been captured while Organic has been able to 
effectively represent the interests of its diverse stakeholders. I will conclude with a policy 
recommendation for Fair Trade to become a more legitimate regulatory body and more effectively 
represent the values of both activists and corporate actors. 
I. Introduction 
Two of the most well-known alternative agrifood initiatives, Fair Trade1 and Organic2, represent 
attempts to subvert ecologically and socially destructive forms of agriculture and production through 
                                                             
1 In this paper, Fair Trade only refers to Fair Trade USA www.fairtradeusa.org unless stated otherwise. 
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new forms of regulation. While they have different missions and goals, both initiatives represent similar 
attempts to create products produced in an environmentally or socially beneficial manner by using 
innovative forms of regulation (i.e. certification labels). Both programs have seen massive expansions in 
brand visibility and awareness as their labels appear on an increasing number of different products. 
However, as both these initiatives were created by progressive activist groups, any partnership with a 
corporate or industry actor utilizing conventional methods of production runs the risk of eroding the 
goals and scope of the initiative, watering it down to nothing more than a seal on conventional 
production. As Fair Trade is privately regulated while Organic is publicly regulated, there may be 
differences in how each initiative responds to the pressures of corporate actors and how they have 
developed in partnership with corporations. 
Both Fair Trade and Organic have faced pressure from corporate and industry actors to water 
down the initiatives to little more than conventional production methods. If these initiatives become 
captured by corporate actors, they will be tailored to the interests of corporations and thus reduce the 
amount of benefits attributed to poor farmers (i.e. Fair Trade) and allow large farms to produce organic 
products with minimal differences from conventional production (i.e. Organic). While both these 
initiatives are regulated within the U.S., Fair Trade’s regulations affect the welfare of small farmers 
across the globe and USDA Organic’s regulations serve as a model for organic programs within other 
countries. 
While previous research has attempted to determine how corporations have diluted the 
standards of each initiative, only one study (Jaffee & Howard 2010) has attempted to compare the 
similar and different effects corporate partnerships have had on the development of the initiatives. As I 
will discuss later, this study is incomplete and lacks substantial reasoning behind its argument. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 In this paper, Organic only refers to USDA Organic http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/nop unless stated 
otherwise. 
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Therefore, I intend expand on this discussion by studying how corporations have diluted each initiative 
and whether the nature of the public and private regulatory bodies makes them more or less inclined to 
be affected by pressures from corporate actors. For each initiative, I will present the standards that are 
most controversial3, discuss why they are included, and determine if the standards are more beneficial 
to activists or corporations. Finally, I will argue the nature of private regulatory bodies makes them more 
likely to be captured than public regulatory bodies. This essay thus is not intended as a critique of Fair 
Trade or Organic; it intends to study whether or not they have been captured by corporate actors. 
 While Fair Trade and Organic have evolved from similar positions and faced similar pressures 
from industry actors, they have been very different in how their respective regulatory boards have 
handled the pressures from industry actors. After the passage of the Organic Foods and Production Act 
in 1990, Organic became publicly regulated through the National Organic Program (NOP), part of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Within the NOP, the rules and regulations are drafted 
by the National Organic Standards Board (NOSB), a group that legally has to represent diverse groups of 
stakeholders. The NOSB is composed of four farmers/growers, three environmentalists/resource 
conservationists, three consumer/public interest advocates, two handlers/processors, one retailer, one 
scientist (toxicology, ecology, or biochemistry) and one USDA accredited certifying agent (Current NOSB 
Members, NOP). The recommendations drafted by the NOSB are then sent to the USDA which publishes 
the final rules and standards in a formal register. 
 Fair Trade is regulated by Fair Trade USA in the United States and Fairtrade International (FLO) 
internationally. After evolving from a diverse group of activists, NGOs, and alternative trade 
organizations (ATOs), Fair Trade USA now represents the most mainstream and well-known Fair Trade 
label in the United States. On the Fair Trade USA Board of Directors is a less diverse group of thirteen 
                                                             
3 Within Fair Trade, I will only include standards that are present within the Coffee initiative as I am assuming that 
Fair Trade’s practices regarding Coffee are representative of the initiative as a whole. 
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people, including three representatives of coffee cooperatives and unions, and four representatives 
from the corporate sector (Who We Are, Fair Trade USA). Fair Trade standards are created through an 
eight-step process that includes Fair Trade USA, key stakeholders, stakeholders, scientific certification 
systems and the broader public as participants (Standard Setting, Fair Trade USA). 
Several academic theories about regulatory commissions have hypothesized about how 
corporations (the regulated segment of industry) have affected the role of the regulators. The Life Cycle 
Theory of Regulatory Commissions4 developed by Merver Bernstein was the first theory to describe how 
regulatory bodies become tools for the benefit of the regulated. Bernstein’s theory on the Life Cycle of 
Regulatory Commissions argues that federal commissions all go through a similar evolutionary process 
that starts with their creation and ends with their decline, a situation in which they become passive in 
regulatory duties or relate to the interests they should be regulating (Bernstein, p. 92). He states that 
regulatory commissions typically go through four periods of their life cycle: “gestation, youth, maturity 
and old age” (Bernstein, p. 74). The general progression of a regulatory commission starts with agitation 
and organization around a problem, leads to formation of the regulatory body, and ends with the 
regulatory body having little to no ability to influence or regulate the regulated groups. 
If the Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions theory were to apply to Fair Trade or Organic, a 
similar evolutionary process would be evident. Each initiative would have formed around significant 
public agitation about conventional agricultural production or low commodity prices. After regulatory 
bodies were formed, they would be aggressive in their attempts to regulate, but would be limited by a 
lack of power and organizational support. Eventually, they would simply regulate disputes within 
industry and become a tool of industry, rather than an independent body with effective regulatory 
power. 
                                                             
4 This article is also the first of several theoretical arguments developed about Regulatory Capture. 
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Kenneth J. Meier expanded Bernstein’s Life Cycle Theory of Regulatory Commissions into his 
own theory of Regulatory Capture. Meier argues that interest groups eventually come to capture (or 
dominate) the process of regulation through their influence on the regulatory agency. He argues that 
interest groups made of industry and corporate actors are the: “only political force in the [regulatory] 
agency’s environment with any stability” (Meier, p. 18). Because of their organizational strength and the 
limited power of the regulatory agency, interest groups pressure “the agency to accommodate its 
needs” (Meier, p. 19). Finally, when the regulatory commission is unable to fight the more powerful 
interest groups, “The agency [is] captured and henceforth [tries] to regulate in the interests of the 
industry [and thus] policy should be responsive to the industry” (Meier, p. 19). 
If the theory of Regulatory Capture were to apply to Fair Trade or Organic, a similar situation 
would be evident. Each initiative’s regulatory body would have relatively little power, especially 
compared to groups of corporate and industry actors. As a result, each regulatory body would be limited 
in its ability to regulate and eventually would come to be influenced by corporate actors to 
accommodate their needs. Finally, each regulatory body would be rendered unable to fight the interest 
groups of corporate and industry actors, and would regulate in the interest of corporations rather than 
in the public interest. 
Using my analysis of the controversial standards included within Fair Trade and Organic, I will 
conclude that Organic’s public regulatory body (the NOSB) has more actively protected the interests of 
diverse groups of stakeholders (activists and corporations), while Fair Trade has only protected the 
interests of corporate actors. While Fair Trade can still provide positive benefits to small farmers, the 
capture of the initiative by corporate actors reduces the amount of benefits that small producers 
receive. I will then analyze each initiative within the theoretical frameworks of Regulatory Capture and 
the Life Cycle Theory of Regulatory Commissions to determine if theory can further explain the nature of 
Jaffe 10 
 
these regulatory bodies. Since my analysis proves that Fair Trade has been captured by corporate actors, 
I will suggest that Fair Trade become publicly regulated (i.e. Organic) to more effectively represent the 
interests of activists and corporations. 
In the second section I will provide background on Fair Trade and Organic, including history of 
their development and how they evolved to become what they are today. I will discuss how Fair Trade 
has affected farmers to show how the benefits from Fair Trade have waned over time as corporate 
influence has increased. I will also discuss the increasing legitimacy of the Organic label through the 
development of the Organic Equivalence Arrangement. In the third section I will present evidence of 
controversial Fair Trade standards, their implications for the movement, and an analysis of whether the 
standard in question benefits activists or corporations. In the fourth section I will present evidence of 
controversial Organic standards, their implications for the movement, and an analysis of whether the 
standards benefit activists or corporations. I will conclude that Organic has more effectively represented 
the values of activists and corporate actors because of the transparency of issues within the initiative 
and the diverse composition of the NOSB. In the fifth section I will conclude that Organic has not been as 
captured as Fair Trade and will recommend that Fair Trade become publicly regulated in order to more 
effectively represent the interests of diverse stakeholders. 
II. The Development and Evolution of Fair Trade and Organic 
a. Introduction 
To provide background on the Fair Trade and Organic alternative initiatives, this paper will 
examine the development of each initiative and any controversies or issues regarding their 
development. I will first discuss issues relative to Fair Trade including background on the coffee industry, 
motives for the movement’s development, the development of the movement, the impact on 
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producers, and the challenges of mainstreaming and corporate partnerships. I will then discuss issues 
relative to USDA Organic including the movement’s development, the development of standards, and 
controversy relating to the standards. 
Although Organic and Fair Trade certify different products, they both primarily certify 
agricultural goods; Fair Trade certifies beans and grains, cocoa, coffee, flowers, fresh fruit, honey, spices 
and herbs, sports balls, sugar, tea, wine and apparel (Fair Trade USA) while USDA Organic certifies 
mainly food and agricultural products (National Organic Program). However, the Fair Trade label is 
primarily known for appearing on coffee. As such, much of the research on Fair Trade focuses 
specifically on coffee and for the purposes of this paper my analysis will only be concerning controversial 
standards within the coffee initiative. In the following sections in which I discuss the development and 
effects of Fair Trade, I thus primarily analyze research regarding Fair Trade coffee. Although most Fair 
Trade products are not produced exactly like coffee, I assume that the development of Fair Trade based 
on the plight of struggling coffee farmers and it’s mission and practices relative to coffee represent the 
organization as a whole. 
b. Overview of Coffee and Fair Trade 
As the second most valuable commodity traded today (after oil), coffee production and 
consumption links developing countries where it is produced with developed countries where it is 
consumed (Haight 2011, p. 76). However, as popular and expensive as coffee has become in developed 
countries, coffee farmers still face fluctuating international coffee prices that usually confine them to a 
life of meager means and poverty. Valkila labels this as the existence of: “‘a coffee paradox’; the global 
coffee business is creating wealth in the consuming countries, while peasant coffee farmers and laborers 
remain in poverty” (Valkila 2010, p. 259). 
Jaffe 12 
 
As a response to these problems, Fair Trade5 and other non-governmental organizations created 
labeling and organizational systems designed to pay coffee farmers better prices for their coffee. FT 
essentially creates a new market for ‘socially just’ coffee by selling coffee with a social justice label at a 
premium. Through my research of Fair Trade and Fair Trade coffee, I have read and organized the 
existing literature into different issues affecting Fair Trade and other organizations including the history 
of coffee as a commodity, the typical coffee farm, the origins of fair trade and alternative trade 
organizations, the impact of Fair Trade on coffee farmers and laborers, the mainstreaming of Fair Trade 
and the effect of corporate partnerships on Fair Trade. 
c. Historical Context 
As one of the most traded commodities, Ponte states that the first attempt to regulate the trade 
of coffee in 1902 by Brazil (a dominant producer at the time) was an attempt to hoard some of their 
supply, thus increasing the overall world price of coffee and increasing profits (Ponte 2001, p. 4411). As 
coffee became more important within the world market, the majority of coffee producing and 
consuming countries signed the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1962 to regulate the world 
trade of coffee (Ponte 2001, p. 4411-12). The ICA worked by assigning quotas to each production 
country. If the world price of coffee fell below a certain level, quotas were tightened and supply was 
limited, but if the world price rose above the set level, the quotas would be loosened and producers 
could sell more. Ponte argues that because the supply and demand for coffee are almost inelastic, 
coffee prices can vary drastically meaning that: “a situation of supply shortage results in high coffee 
prices without a significant reduction in consumption [and vice versa]” (Ponte 2001, p. 4411). However, 
                                                             
5
 The definition of Fair Trade used for this paper is: “an alternative approach to conventional trade that aims to 
improve their livelihoods and well-being of small producers by improving their market access, strengthening their 
organizations, paying them a fair price with a fixed minimum, and providing continuity in trading relationships” 
(Daviron & Ponte, p. 173). 
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Rice argues that because quotas were set based on prior production levels, producers were encouraged 
to increase production at the expense of quality (Rice 1999, p. 563). 
While riddled with problems, the ICA generally kept the price of coffee relatively high and 
stable. After the collapse of the ICA in 1989, the prices of coffee decreased and became less stable, 
resulting in lower profits for producers and higher profits for sellers within consuming countries: 
“between 1989-90 and 1994-95, the proportion of total income gained by producers dropped to 13 
percent (from 20 percent in the 1970s); the proportion retained in consuming countries surged to 78 
percent (from 53 percent in the 1970s)” (Ponte 2001, p. 4413). Thus not only did farmers earn lower 
prices and shares of total revenue following the collapse of the ICA, they also faced fluctuating prices 
that often were higher than their costs of production. 
d. The Typical Coffee Farm 
One of Fair Trade’s initiatives is for farmers to grow coffee more sustainably like a traditional 
coffee farm, rather than modern or ‘technified’ farms which are streamlined to increase production. 
Rice states that coffee is typically grown, “[…] in the mid- and high-elevation mountainous zones of 
tropical America”, further adding that coffee lands in Latin America cover 3.1 million hectares, making 
the region a large share of the coffee producing market (Rice 1999, p. 558). He argues that the typical 
coffee farm has been radically changed by modernization and the forces of neoliberalism in the push to 
standardize and increase production. Behind pushes by USAID, Latin American farmers saw 
technification as a path towards more profits and success. He states that a traditional coffee farm is a 
shaded environment with species diversity that requires little inputs or labor to maintain. In contrast, a 
modern or ‘technified’ farm often has the coffee plants directly exposed to the sun and planted in 
organized rows. A technified farm also requires the use of chemical fertilizers, as the unshaded farms 
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lose the benefits of the nutrients deposited in the soil by plants in shaded, lush farms. Technified farms 
thus require more labor to maintain the crops and spray the fertilizers (Rice 1999, p. 568). 
e. Origins of Fair Trade Movement 
Part of the alternative trade movement, fair trade originated in the 1960s in Europe. Fair trade 
seeks to provide alternative solutions to imbalances within the global trade system and is, “an 
alternative approach to conventional trade that aims to improve their livelihoods and well-being of 
small producers by improving their market access, strengthening their organizations, paying them a fair 
price with a fixed minimum, and providing continuity in trading relationships” (Daviron & Ponte, p. 173). 
It originally was targeted at helping small farmers in developing countries because: “farmers are often 
prey to ‘cut and thrust’ and predatory merchants, urban-based companies or their agents who show 
only contempt for rural life and ‘uneducated’ rural people” and because rural farmers were not targeted 
through structural adjustment programs reforms because they were not seen as profitable players in the 
market (Tiffen 2002, p. 386). Therefore, not only were rural farmers subject to exploitation through 
powerful intermediaries but they were also marginalized through the expansion of neoliberal policies 
that did nothing but leave them powerless within the world market.  Fair trade was thus a response to 
an imbalanced market structure that concentrated power among large commodity purchasers while 
isolating and marginalizing poor farmers. It was created to fulfill the: “need for new international 
business models that connect smallholders and very poor farmers more appropriately into global 
markets” (Tiffen 2002, p. 391). 
 After the creation of the first fair trade labeling organization in the Netherlands named Max 
Havelaar, this and other similar fair trade labeling organizations merged into Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International (FLO). FLO is an international certification body for labeling fair trade coffee, 
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with Transfair USA6 being the certification arm for the United States (which later became Fair Trade 
USA) (Haight 2011, p. 76). Fair Trade originally only certified democratically operated cooperatives 
organized of small coffee producers (with less than three hectares of land) (Valkila 2010, p. 264) that 
agree to follow certain organizational and ethical procedures (sustainable growing techniques), 
constituting about 1 percent of overall coffee production in 2006 (Sick 2008, p. 198). Figure 1 shows a 
Fair Trade and conventional marketing chain for coffee from Nicaragua to Sweden to show the 
difference between the Fair Trade and conventional supply chains. Fair Trade subsequently expanded its 
certification to include many other agricultural and craft products, although it still mainly certifies 
agricultural products. 
  
                                                             
6 As I will discuss later, Transfair USA left FLO in 2011 and became Fair Trade USA. 
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Figure 1: Marketing Chain of Coffee from Nicaragua to Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thick arrow represents the predominant trade route. The dashed arrows indicate how the fair trade 
movement operated initially, when specialized roasting companies sourced coffee directly from small 
producer organizations (The Coffee Value Chain, Valkila 2010). 
Small scale farmers Estates (large farms) 
Producing Country 
Cooperatives Export Companies 
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f. Effect of Fair Trade on Coffee Producers 
Fair Trade is designed to help small farmers receive better, more stable prices for commodities. 
Fair Trade sets a price for coffee and adds a price premium on top of the price to be used for community 
development projects. If the world price rises above the fixed Fair Trade price, the farmer is paid the 
world price as well as the price premium, implying that farmers under Fair Trade labels receive higher 
wages. In other words, if the world price of coffee was $1/lb and the Fair Trade set price was $1.26/lb 
farmers would be receiving a high price for Fair Trade coffee but if the world price rose to $1.30/lb (over 
the set FT price), Fair Trade would add a premium to the world price (e.g. $0.10/lb) and thus pay for 
example $1.40/lb. Valkila states that: “during 2000-2004, when the international coffee prices were low 
[‘the coffee crisis’; prices were extremely low compared to previous years], the Fair Trade minimum 
price increased prices substantially for those cooperatives that were able to sell to Fair Trade markets 
[because it was much higher than the world price], but during 2005-2008, the Fair Trade minimum price 
has been within the volatility of market prices, and thus has had less significance for producer 
organizations [the FT price has been within the range of the world prices]” (Valkila 2010, p. 262). He 
further states that from 2004-2006, the price received by FT farmers after cost deductions within a 
cooperative was about $0.88/lb and the average price received by conventional coffee farmers at the 
time was $0.83/lb (Valkila 2010, p. 263). Thus, the Fair Trade price was only significantly higher than the 
world price during periods of low coffee prices (or equivalently when there was an oversupply of coffee 
on the world market). Also, while the average price paid to FT farmers was higher and more stable, the 
variability of the conventional price meant that it was higher than the FT set price at times (although the 
addition of the price premium to the world price would become the new FT price). 
Still, Geiger-Oneto states that: “a significantly larger percentage of TF (Transfair, a fair trade 
label) farmers reported an increase in their income [and] also scored higher on the composite quality of 
life index than non-TF farmers” (Geiger-Oneto 2011, p. 284). Thus not only did the farmers in this study 
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report higher incomes after the introduction of Fair Trade, but they also reported a higher subjective 
quality of life. Sick also argues that the greatest benefit farmers received from FT was not the higher 
price but: “the organizational skills and other forms of human and social capital” received through 
membership of the cooperative (Sick 2008, p. 198). Thus, while the prices received by FT producers may 
be marginally better, the true benefits of the system may lie in membership of a cooperative rather than 
just FT labeling. 
g. Mainstreaming of Fair Trade 
More recently, researchers have analyzed Fair Trade’s mainstreaming of many products, the 
impact mainstreaming has had on the label and certification program and the potential challenges that 
mainstreaming creates for Fair Trade. Through the example of the Day Chocolate Company, Doherty 
argues that Fair Trade can mainstream and increase brand visibility without significantly compromising 
the benefits accrued to small producers. Doherty studies what he labels as “radical mainstreaming”, 
which he defines as: “[mainstreaming] projects that maintain the transformative message of FT” - of the 
Day Chocolate Company (now the Divine Chocolate Company) in the United Kingdom (Doherty 2007, p. 
701).  
He explains that cocoa (and thus chocolate) became a certifiable Fair Trade product for similar 
reasons as coffee due to the industry and market structure: “Just a few large companies […] account for 
75 per cent of the chocolate market [and] there are diminishing numbers of processing facilities and 
relatively few end-users in the market” (Tiffen 2002, p. 389). As with the coffee market, the chocolate 
market has many small farmers providing supply, but only a few large companies providing demand, 
creating a situation in which the farmers are powerless to the whims of the market. 
The Day Chocolate Company was developed as an “100 per cent FT business” with the mission 
of “providing more equitable market access for Ghanaian cocoa growers and […] equity ownership […] 
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for its supplier Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Cooperative” (Doherty 2007, p. 694). The company wanted to 
mainstream its Fair Trade products because it believed that it would not be possible to create a 
legitimate business without being able to “compete in the mainstream” and they believed that 
mainstreaming could increase sales and create greater awareness about Fair Trade products (Doherty 
2007, p. 702). Still, they recognized the potential difficulty of translating the message of Fair Trade to the 
average mainstream consumer. As such, the company intended to create a recognizable brand that was 
also easily available to consumers like other mainstream chocolate manufacturers. However, Day 
Chocolate was aware of the possible challenges of mainstreaming their Fair Trade product and 
competing in the mainstream market because: “Mainstream chocolate company practices do not come 
close to such standards and guidelines for trading partnerships that benefit smallholders” (Tiffen 2002, 
p. 391). Thus, they created a clear mission for mainstreaming to address these challenges: “Our mission 
[…] is to be highly visible in debates about fair trade, to act as a bridge between consumers and primary 
producers, and to act as passionate advocates for a trading system that brings dignity and respect to all 
its participants” (Doherty 2007, p. 701). Therefore, not only did Day Chocolate commit to fully 
embracing the Fair Trade mission within the mainstream market, it also committed to help spread 
awareness and knowledge about the Fair Trade label and program. 
Doherty then argues that Day Chocolate is an example of ‘radical mainstreaming’ in that it has 
been able to mainstream while maintaining its original model and mission of a ‘100 per cent FT’ 
company: “Day has not limited itself to the price and quality message which Lowe and Davenport 
(2005b) argue is a danger of being in the mainstream” (Doherty 2007, p. 702). Day Chocolate has also 
been successful in increasing its sales and availability; from 2004-2006 Day Chocolate’s sales increased 
by at least 30 percent every year (Doherty 2007, p. 706). 
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Doherty’s example of Day Chocolate clearly shows that it is possible for Fair Trade to enter the 
mainstream without diluting or reducing the values allocated to small producers. Doherty elaborates 
that the fact that Day Chocolate has been able to mainstream its product while still maintaining the 
original model and mission of Fair Trade is important because: “FT is not just about the price premium 
but primarily about changing the relationship between producers and consumers” (Doherty 2007, p. 
701). He believes that this is very important because often mainstreaming Fair Trade products leads to 
“‘clean-washing’ (or equivalently “fair-washing”), which occurs when a company ‘derives positive 
benefits from its association with the fair-trade movement, however minimal its efforts to ‘live’ the 
values” (Doherty 2007, p. 694). However, the Day Chocolate company is not an example of ‘clean-
washing’ in that it shows that the: “alternative business model that challenges the conventional 
international trading system can work” and that: “it is possible to mainstream and be radical [maintain 
the original message]” (Doherty 2007, p. 707-8). Thus it is clearly possible for Fair Trade and its partners 
to mainstream their products without significantly reducing the benefits originally intended from Fair 
Trade. 
h. Corporate Partnerships and Fair Trade 
Recently, much of the literature about Fair Trade has discussed it’s corporate partnerships and 
the effect the partnerships have had on the movement. As stated before, the success and growth of the 
Organic and Fair Trade initiatives have made them attractive to corporate actors who also saw them as 
gateways into niche markets. However, many individuals fear that corporate partnerships within these 
initiatives could result in a dilution of the values of the initiative as corporate actors sought to weaken 
the regulations of the initiative. Thus much of the recent research about Fair Trade is concerned with 
the question: Have corporate partnerships weakened the movement? 
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Fair Trade’s first corporate partnership was with Starbucks Coffee and began in April 2000, after 
pressure from activists demanding for the company to buy Fair Trade coffee because of charges of labor 
violations in some of its plantation suppliers in Central America (Jaffee 2012, p. 95). Although Starbucks 
agreed to sell Fair Trade coffee in all of its stores, initially less than 1% of its supply was FT coffee (Jaffee 
2012, p. 95). 
After the initial partnership with Starbucks, other corporations partnered with Fair Trade 
including Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). These corporations also bought low 
levels of Fair Trade coffee: “usually less than 1% of their total volume” (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). Corporate 
partnerships thus increase sales and visibility of Fair Trade products but run the risk of being used more 
for corporate gain than to promote the movement (shown through low purchase levels). 
Jaffee further describes how the entrance of these corporate actors has led to conflicts between 
the original activist movement and the new corporate partners. He labels what he sees as the five key 
areas of debate between the activists and the corporations as: “(1) the distinction between ‘movement-
oriented’ [activists] and ‘market-oriented’ [corporations] fair trade retailers; (2) the relationship of 
Transfair USA to these two groups of licensees, including the question of minimum entry requirements 
for licensing; (3) the level of fair trade minimum prices; (4) the increasing certification of plantation 
agriculture; and (5) issues of fairness along the supply chain, as well as how best to manage market 
growth” (Jaffee 2010, p. 273). These areas of controversy are still actively debated within the 
movement. 
Also controversial has been Transfair USA’s decision to leave FLO: “in order to permit unlimited 
certification of plantation-produced coffee and other crops” (Jaffee 2012, p. 109). This was the result of 
a debate within FLO over which plantation-products could be certified that resulted in FLO allowing 
plantation certification for all of their products except: “cocoa, coffee, honey and cotton [which] remain 
Jaffe 22 
 
for the moment limited to smallholder production” (Jaffee 2012, p. 109). Although Jaffee does not 
analyze why these four products remained smallholder-production while the others did not, it is likely 
that the original mission of Fair Trade to help rural, marginalized, small landowners and not plantation 
laborers was essential to the preservation of plantation-free product certification for these four 
products. 
Jaffee uses the conceptual frameworks of cooptation, regulatory capture, and dilution (defined 
later) as well as other evidence to determine whether corporate actors have tried to manipulate the 
movement to their advantage. He first concludes that mainstreaming Fair Trade through corporate 
partnerships has created massive growth of the U.S. market, making it the largest Fair Trade market in 
the world, creating positive implications for the brand’s increasing visibility (Jaffee 2010, p. 272). 
However, he then concludes that: “The phenomenon of cooptation – manifested as both standards 
dilution and regulatory capture – has clearly taken place and continues to occur in the context of the 
U.S. fair trade system” (Jaffee 2010, p. 281). Indeed, he states that while many activists still try to work 
within the Fair Trade system, many of the 100% Fair Trade companies have left the label as a response 
to the controversies (Jaffee 2010, p. 279). However, he believes that if the certification body were to 
hold its licensees accountable to regulations that are consistent with the founding values, Fair Trade 
could become more legitimate. However, this optimism seems to be discredited earlier in his analysis 
when he notes: “Licensing fees accounted for 67.4% of Transfair USA’s revenue in 2007 […] the fees paid 
by Starbucks alone in 2008 […] account for approximately 17% of the certifier’s operating budget” 
(Jaffee 2010, p. 275). Thus, not only is Transfair USA nearly dependent on licensing fees for its revenue, 
the large corporate actors are such a large portion of the licensing revenue that the organization is 
unlikely to change its standards in a way that would alienate its corporate partners. Clearly there are 
many questionable aspects of the Fair Trade and corporate partnerships, implying the need for a more 
thorough analysis to determine the evolution and residual effects of the partnerships. 
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i. Organic Background 
Similar to the Fair Trade movement, the Organic movement surfaced in the 1970s through 
several different groups of activists who were critical of conventional agriculture and wanted to know 
how their food was grown and produced (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 390). These activists, while having 
different opinions about the way food should be processed, all were unanimous in their rejection of the 
conventional agriculture system which they viewed as an: “impersonal, chemically dependent, agro-
industrial complex” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 390). These different groups came to use the term 
organic to label products that were produced under more stringent environmental regulations, and 
many different groups created their own certification programs for their respective labels. As different 
organic labels propagated and the organic movement increased its visibility, consumers and government 
officials became concerned that the multitude of organic labels could lead to fake organic products or an 
inconsistency across labeling programs. In response, the federal government passed the Organic Foods 
Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) to create a single national organic standard regulated by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), “that would eliminate the slippage in quality and credibility 
inherent in multiple sets of standards” (DeLind 2000, p. 199). However, the passage of the OFPA was 
supported by special interests that wanted to lower the costs of using multiple standards and thus may 
have been business motivated, rather than ethically motivated, from its initiation. 
j. Organic Standards Development & Controversy 
After the passage of OFPA, the National Organic Standards Board became responsible for 
creating the set of standards and regulations that would delineate a product as organic. After four years 
of deliberations beginning in 1992, the NOSB submitted its final proposal to the United States 
Department of Agriculture. The first incident of pressure by corporate actors to influence the Organic 
movement became evident as the USDA published its proposed organic rule in 1997. The 1997 proposal 
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disregarded many of the suggestions proposed by the NOSB and included three very controversial 
additions to the NOSB’s proposal: “The acceptance of food irradiation for controlling spoilage and 
bacterial contamination, sewage sludge as a soil amendment, and genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) constituted three of the most glaring departures” (DeLind 2000, p. 199). In response to this 
glaring defiance of the NOSB’s recommendations, over 275,000 people sent comments to the USDA, 
urging the removal of the three previously mentioned amendments (DeLind 2000, p. 199). Many organic 
farmers were so incensed that they considered leaving the USDA created organic label to create their 
own independent label (DeLind 2000, p. 199). Others pessimistically accepted this as part of an 
inevitable organic standardization process in which, “these desirable food-system characteristics are 
threatened as the definition of organic farming and food is narrowed to a set of standards which deal 
with growing and processing methods exclusively, and are acceptable to the food industry” (DeLind 
2000, p. 199). 
After receiving the huge public response to its first proposed rule, the USDA finally published a 
final rule in 2002 that delineated what defined an organic product. The rule defined organic agriculture 
as, “implementing regulations ‘to respond to site-specific conditions by integrating cultural, biological, 
and mechanical practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance, and conserve 
biodiversity’” (Chen 2012, p. 218). However, the definitions put forth by the NOSB and the EU (as I 
discuss later) are much more extensive than the USDA’s. Still, the rule notably excluded the three 
previously mentioned additions to the proposed rule of 1997 (food irradiation, sewage sludge, GMOs) 
and was actually: “fairly strict with respect to prohibiting other unacceptable inputs” (Jaffee & Howard 
2010, p. 390). However, the rule removed any references to “the higher ideals of organic found in some 
regional certification systems [and actually] creates a ‘ceiling’ by prohibiting organic certifiers from 
enforcing stricter standards than those required by the USDA” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 390). 
Therefore, the decision appeared to protect the uniformity that the USDA wished to create with the 
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standard but it destroyed the wish of the original Organic movement activists to increase the stringency 
of the standard over time (similar to the intent of the initial Fair Trade activists). 
As a result of the development of a national organic standard, “sales of organic foods in the U.S. 
increased dramatically, with an average 20% annual growth almost every year since 1990” (Jaffee & 
Howard 2010, p. 390). The organic label owes much of this growth to partnerships with corporations 
and agribusiness indicated, “by the fact that 14 of the 20 largest food processors in North America have 
either acquired organic brands or introduced organic versions of their existing brands” (Jaffee & Howard 
2010, p. 391). Thus the organic label has seen tremendous growth in sales and visibility since its creation 
by the USDA. 
k.  The Organic Equivalence Arrangement 
As stated before, the definition of organic as provided by the USDA is different than the organic 
definition provided by the European Union. This has been problematic in that some organic products 
from the U.S. cannot be sold as organic products in the EU and some products from the EU cannot be 
sold as organic in the US. However, the legitimacy created by the state-run USDA Organic label has led 
to the adoption of the Organic Equivalence Arrangement between the United States and European 
Union in 2012, in which: “the United States and European Union have each agreed to treat the other’s 
jurisdiction’s system of organic certification as equivalent to its own” (Chen 2012, p. 213). 
Before the adoption of the agreement, the US and EU both expressed concerns about the 
other’s organic program. The EU did not allow any products produced with GMOs to be certified as 
organic and would not accept imports of apples or pears from the US that had been produced with the 
use of antibiotics (Chen 2012, p. 221). The US did not allow any “agricultural products derived from 
animals treated with antibiotics” and thus was initially wary of the EU organic label for this reason (Chen 
2012, p. 221). Thus to reduce barriers to trade between the EU and the US agreed to the Organic 
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Equivalence Arrangement. Somewhat surprisingly, the agreement represents an effective compromise 
with each side agreeing to the inclusion of the other side’s demands in the arrangement, resulting: “to 
push both sides’ agricultural standards toward more rather than less stringency” (Chen 2012, p. 222). 
This is positive in multiple aspects in that it standardizes the definition of organic between the EU and 
US and creates more stringent regulations for organic, showing original activists that state-created 
regulations do not have to be watered down to the most minimal of regulations and can actually 
influence the development of other countries’ organic initiatives. 
Chen is very positive in his analysis of this arrangement, stating that: “[the Organic Equivalence 
Arrangement] represents the triumph of aesthetics and environmental philosophy over the traditional 
drivers of agricultural policy and food law in the United States” (Chen 2012, p. 214). What he describes 
as the victory of philosophy over science is the respect given to the organic ideal of producing food 
without agrochemicals or GMOs (even though it is not scientifically proven to be better for health), and 
the inclusion of values which delineate holistic agricultural production over economic considerations of 
efficient production (Chen 2012, p. 223). Thus, the Organic Equivalence Arrangement represents a 
positive piece of legislation that suggests that alternative agrifood initiatives can become standardized 
without significantly departing from the original values and mission of the movements’ founders and 
that state-created initiatives have strong legitimacy in that they can influence the development of 
similar initiatives in different countries. 
l. Organic vs. Fair Trade: Differences in Corporate Cooptation 
In the article Corporate Cooptation of Organic and Fair Trade Standards by Daniel Jaffee and 
Philip Howard, they compare the development of Organic and Fair Trade to determine if one of the 
initiatives has been more coopted than the other, using concepts from sociological theory. As I will 
discuss in greater detail in the following section, cooptation as used in sociological theory describes: 
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“the efforts of states or government entities to neutralize the effectiveness of movements for social 
change” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 389). They also use the concepts of regulatory capture and 
weakening standards which I also define in the follow sections. 
 They first outline what they determine are the main points of conflict in the development of 
each initiatives’ standards. Within the USDA Organic’s development of standards the initial points of 
conflict were over the inclusion of three additions to the NOSB proposal, “(1) irradiation, (2) sewage 
sludge and (3) genetically modified organisms” (Jaffee & Howard, p. 390). However, after the exclusion 
of these stipulations in the 2002 rule, the points of conflict within the organic standards have switched 
to: “(1) the definition of animal access to pasture; (2) the definition of allowable inputs; and (3) 
extension to other products, such as cosmetics, pet food and fish” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 391). By 
contrast, the points of conflict over the development of Fair Trade standards are: “(1) the distinction 
between ‘movement-oriented’ and ‘market-oriented’ fair trade retailers; (2) the relationship of Transfair 
USA to these two groups of licensees, including the question of minimum entry requirements for 
licensing; (3) the level of fair trade minimum prices; (4) the increasing certification of plantation 
agriculture; and (5) issues of fairness along the supply chain, as well as how best to manage market 
growth” (Jaffee 2010, p. 273). Although the conflicts are different, they are similar in that they both 
represent debates between movement activists and industry players over what is feasible and what 
legitimizes the certification programs. 
After an analysis in which the authors argue that both Fair Trade and Organic have been 
coopted by industry actors, the authors then conclude that “the organic sector is both subject to more 
industry influence, and its standards more compromised, than fair trade”7 (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 
395). They then go on to state as explanation: “the major battles over organic standards arguably have 
                                                             
7 The opposite of the conclusion made in this paper. 
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already been fought and settled” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 395). They therefore argue that the 
development of organic standards by the state gives them a “legal finality” that is not present within 
Fair Trade, and that limits the Organic label by already having decided the major controversies over the 
standards (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 395). 
m. Analysis of Organic and Fair Trade Cooptation Article 
The argument that Organic is more coopted than Fair Trade is very under supported and does 
not even address many relevant issues. As stated before, after the inclusion of three controversial 
additions to the proposed organic rule (irradiation, sewage sludge and GMOs), a large public outcry was 
able to effectively remove the three controversial additions from the document. While this fight may be 
settled and have the “legal finality” the authors suggest, the decision favored activists rather than 
industry, showing that “legal finality” may not imply any negative results (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 395). 
This and the recent Organic Equivalence Agreement between the US and EU (in which each initiative 
became more stringent in standards) suggest that the “legal finality” that the authors imply within the 
USDA Organic Label is not actually relevant; the standard can change to become more stringent (Jaffee 
& Howard 2010, p. 395). 
The authors also suggest that corporations have more influence within Organic than Fair Trade. 
However, the NOSB legally has to represent groups of diverse stakeholders8, meaning that any decision 
drafted by the NOSB represents a compromise between corporate actors and activists. This clearly 
reduces corporate actors influence in the movement by creating a balanced regulatory body (shown 
through NOSB documentation that consistently addresses diverse interests). In contrast, Fair Trade’s 
regulatory body does not have to represent diverse groups of stakeholders. As a result, its regulatory 
body is predominantly composed of corporate and business affiliates. In addition, Fair Trade USA  is very 
                                                             
8 The composition of the NOSB is discussed in the introduction. 
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dependent on the participation of corporate actors because: “almost seventy percent of Transfair USA’s9 
revenue was from licensing fees, […] the majority of those fees were paid by large corporate partners 
and […] Transfair USA was thus unlikely to change its regulations in ways that would ‘alienate a large 
licensee’” (Jaffee 2010, p. 275). Jaffee additionally argued that this created a dependency on the 
partnership with corporate actors, admitting: “The phenomenon of cooptation – manifested as both 
standards dilution and regulatory capture – has clearly taken place and continues to occur in the context 
of the U.S. fair trade system” (Jaffee 2010, p. 281).  However, the National Organic Program within the 
USDA does not have this dependency on revenue from its licensees, as it is funded by the government. 
Clearly, corporations have much more influence within Fair Trade rather than Organic, as the authors 
imply. 
In addition, the authors ignore the difference in transparency between the two initiatives. The 
NOSB, the standards-making body for the NOP, is much more transparent than Transfair USA or the FLO, 
meaning that anyone from the general public can access documents about future meetings, 
developments within the organic label, and give input about the USDA organic standards. This is 
important because it makes information about the program and its development much more available 
to the public, shown by the 1997 public outcry against the proposed rule for organic. By contrast, Fair 
Trade USA and FLO are not very transparent. FLO does list its standards and recent changes to standards 
on its website, but does not allow public input in development of standards. Fair Trade USA does not list 
developments within its standards on its website and does not allow public input in development of 
standards. Therefore, Fair Trade standards are essentially created by their board of directors behind 
closed doors; their changes and additions listed in the form of press releases rather than forums for 
public opinion. Given the short explanation and lack of data to support their conclusion, the authors’ 
conclusion that organic is more subject to industry influence is clearly incomplete and under supported. 
                                                             
9 Now Fair Trade USA. 
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n. Bernstein’s Life Cycle Theory of Regulatory Commissions 
As stated before, Merver Bernstein argues that regulatory commissions all go through similar 
evolutionary processes that starts with their formation and ends as they become passive regulatory 
bodies or regulatory tools used for the benefit of industry. The life cycle of a regulatory commission thus 
involves four periods: “gestation, youth, maturity and old age” (Bernstein, p. 74). 
The gestation phase is the process of gathering support for regulation through “mounting 
distress over a problem” (Bernstein, p. 74). Organizational groups that want regulation garner more 
support when the distress is more prominent, and oppositional groups gather to “maintain the status 
quo” (Bernstein, p. 75). Eventually legislation is enacted, although it tends to be very limited and lacks 
clarity (Bernstein, p. 75). Advocates of regulation generally want short term rather than long term 
success in regulation, but regulatory reform is actually a long process that develops in the long term. 
The youth phase involves the newly created regulatory body. When it is established, the 
regulatory body has very little power, organization or experience (Bernstein, p. 79). In contrast, the 
regulated groups are very organized and prepared to protect themselves from regulation (Bernstein, p. 
79). Still, during this phase the regulatory body is often very vigorous in its approach to regulation 
because: “Merely passive enforcement of commission laws will not long command public respect and 
confidence and serve as a remedy for abuses” (Bernstein, p. 80-81). Typically, regulatory commissions 
are taken to court by the regulated interests to determine the power and scope of the regulatory 
bodies. In court, regulated interests are protected by established lawyers that attack the role of the 
regulatory commission and the commissioners themselves, causing the regulated body to lose public 
support. At this point, the regulatory commission realizes that effective regulation is often not feasible. 
In the maturity phase, the controversy of the commission fades away as the commission 
becomes solely a tool to solve disputes within the regulated interests (Bernstein, p. 86). The commission 
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regulates according to the desires of industry and becomes more of a “manager of an industry” than a 
regulatory body (Bernstein, p. 87). The end of this phase is “marked by the commission’s surrender to 
the regulated” or when it becomes a tool of the regulated, rather than an effective regulatory 
commission (Bernstein, p. 90). 
The old age phase is a gradual loss of power for the regulatory commission as it becomes a 
passive body or a tool for regulated groups. In this phase, the regulatory body’s function: “is the 
maintenance of the status quo in the regulated industry and its own position as recognized protector of 
the industry” (Bernstein, p. 92). Essentially, the regulatory body no longer serves as a regulatory tool for 
the public but rather becomes a tool to protect the interests of industry. 
o. Regulatory Capture 
Kenneth J. Meier further developed Bernstein’s Life Cycle Theory in his theory of Regulatory 
Capture. He first states that regulatory agencies are typically created in an environment in which 
industry actors or interest groups are the only stable forces (Meier, p. 18). These interest groups form 
coalitions in order to affect and direct regulatory policy (Meier, p. 19). Eventually, industry actors will be 
able to pressure the regulatory agency to “accommodate its needs” and effectively capture the 
regulatory agency (Meier, p. 19). He then elaborates that capture is expected in regulation because, 
“regulatory policy reflects the interests and the power of the concerned groups […] policy should be 
responsive to industry” (Meier, p. 19). He notes that an industry’s (or interest group’s) ability to capture 
the agency designed to regulate it is determined by its size, resources, dispersion, cohesion, intensity of 
commitment, prestige, number of groups, and coalition breadth (Meier, p. 19-21). 
However, Meier notes a flaw in the theory of Regulatory Capture. He states that “in numerous 
cases regulatory agencies regulate the industry vigorously even though only industry groups are well 
organized (e.g., airline safety, banking, pharmaceuticals)” (Meier, p. 19). He argues that because of 
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pressure from sources other than interest groups, regulatory policy is not always solely dictated by 
interest groups. 
III. Methods 
In order to compare how corporate and industry actors have affected the development of Fair 
Trade and Organic, I will compare the development of controversial standards within each initiative, 
assuming that any standard not controversial to activists or corporations benefits both parties. Within 
Fair Trade and Organic, corporate influence is shown both through the adoption of controversial 
standards and through the dilution of standards to lower bars of entry. As research states: “Such 
strategies of standards weakening or bar-lowering […] set up an important contradiction: permitting the 
entry of low-road competitors […] clearly threatens to reduce the potential rent or price premium to be 
gained from the niche” (Jaffee 2010, p. 271). Thus, not only do controversial and weakened standards 
threaten the integrity of the initiatives, they also permit the entry of conventional firms that threaten 
the price premium associated with these products. For this analysis, I will focus on the outcomes of the 
developments of the standards rather than the standards-making process, because the standards-
making process of each initiative is much more convoluted than the actual outcomes of the standards. 
However, since my analysis only focuses on controversial standards within each initiative, it is possible 
that there could be additional evidence of capture that is not presented within this paper. 
Since coffee is the most prominent Fair Trade product, I will focus my analysis on controversial 
standards within their coffee initiative. Jaffee 2010 states what he calls the controversial aspects of Fair 
Trade between activists and corporations: “(1) the distinction between ‘movement-oriented’ and 
‘market-oriented’ fair trade retailers; (2) the relationship of Transfair USA to these two groups of 
licensees, including the question of minimum entry requirements for licensing; (3) the level of fair trade 
minimum prices; (4) the increasing certification of plantation agriculture; and (5) issues of fairness along 
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the supply chain” (Jaffee 2010, p. 273). Since several of the issues Jaffee mentions are not covered 
within Fair Trade standards (movement-oriented vs. market oriented retailers, and issues of fairness 
along the supply chain), I will only analyze controversial standards recommended or contained within 
Fair Trade standards (minimum entry requirements, fair trade minimum prices, plantation 
certifications). However, since Fair Trade is not very transparent, it does not release documentation 
relating to the development of its standards. Because of this, I will use evidence from Jaffee and other 
researchers to define and explain the controversial standards within Fair Trade. 
Within USDA Organic, researchers have documented the major controversial standards between 
activists and corporations. DeLind notes that in the proposed final rule for Organic: “The acceptance of 
food irradiation for controlling spoilage and bacterial contamination, sewage sludge as a soil 
amendment, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) constituted three of the most glaring 
departures” (DeLind 2000, p. 199). While these standards were removed from the Final Rule, I include 
them in my analysis because they represent the first attempt by corporate actors to weaken the Organic 
initiative. After these standards were removed from Organic, the fight between activist and corporations 
has moved to: “(1) the definition of animal access to pasture; (2) the definition of allowable inputs; and 
(3) extension to other products” (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 391). In addition to these controversies, the 
Organic Consumer’s Association has also fought against the attempted addition of nanotechnology to 
the Organic program (OCA’s Ongoing Campaign to Safeguard Organic Standards). Thus, for my analysis 
of controversial Organic standards, I will first discuss the addition and removal of irradiation, sewage 
sludge and GMOs. I will then discuss the more recent fights over animal access to pasture, allowable 
inputs, other certifiable products and the question of nanotechnology. Although all of the controversial 
standards are publicly documented by the NOSB, some of the standards I will discuss have been 
recommended to be changed or implemented, meaning that they are not yet formally a part of the NOP. 
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After I present the controversial standards within each initiative, I will determine whether 
activists or corporations benefitted more from the addition or removal of the controversial aspect. I will 
then analyze each initiative as a whole, to determine if it has been captured by industry or if the 
outcomes of the controversial standards represent a more balanced result for both parties. 
IV. Fair Trade: Controversial Standards and Analysis 
As stated before, Fair Trade was originally created by groups of activists, NGOs and alternative 
trade organizations (ATOs) to provide opportunities for small farmers marginalized by the international 
trade system to sell ethically produced products. As such, these activists had specific goals that they 
wished to see enacted in the Fair Trade standards. 
Their principle value was to pay farmers a fair fixed price that was higher than the market price 
and would not fluctuate as much as world prices. As Jaffee 2010 states: “A ‘fair price’ was the raison 
d’etre for fair trade’s creation, and it is arguably upon the premise of a fairer price that the moral power 
of the system continues to rest” (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). In the late 1980s when ATOs began forming Fair 
Trade movements, they initially set a price, “based on assessments of producers’ costs and livelihood 
needs” (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). In addition to the fixed price, coffee producers were also paid a price 
premium that was intended to be democratically allocated to community development projects. 
Another prominent value of FT activists was to only certify groups of small producers10 
organized in democratic cooperatives that followed specific environmental and ethical producers (Sick 
2008, p. 198). Fair Trade was designed to empower small farmers who were nearly powerless in the 
international trade system and thus it wished to extend its certification system only to farmers with 
small amounts of land. Estate and plantation products were not part of original Fair Trade movements 
                                                             
10 In this case, small producers is defined as producers with “less than 3 hectares of land” (Valkila, p. 264).  
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because they had easier access to markets and were seen as representational of conventional 
production. 
An additional value of FT activists was to ensure a minimum commitment to Fair Trade. Activists 
recommended that companies should be required to buy at least a certain percentage of their overall 
product as Fair Trade. The Equal Exchange coffee company, a Fair Trade activist group, was one of the 
main activists pushing for a minimum commitment to Fair Trade, noting that: “this would help ensure 
long term commitment and not just token participation ” (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). In addition they: “also 
encouraged that the bar be raised steadily over time” (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). Both of these concerns 
reflect activists’ desires for companies to have legitimate commitments to Fair Trade, the logic being 
that without a minimum purchase requirement, corporations could purchase small amounts of Fair 
Trade coffee and promote themselves as buying ethically sourced coffee and running risk of “fair-
washing” (Jaffee 2012, p. 107). 
Corporate actors on the other hand, had different values and goals that they wished to achieve 
through Fair Trade. Corporate actors first wanted to be able to sell Fair Trade products at prices that 
would make them competitive within a supermarket setting. As I will state later, the minimum price for 
Fair Trade coffee has fallen dramatically in real terms since the first established price in 1988. Jaffee 
2012 argues that: “These stagnating price levels reflected a political stalemate between the economic 
interests of the large commercial players in the certification system, and producer organizations” (Jaffee 
2012, p. 108). Therefore, the decline in purchasing power of the Fair Trade price has not been a result of 
inflation; rather it has been the result of corporate pressure to keep the price low and competitive. 
Corporate actors also wanted to be able to certify more products than just those produced in 
small producer cooperatives. Since some products were not typically produced in small producer 
cooperatives, it appeared that extending Fair Trade certification to plantations could provide laborers 
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with better wages and working conditions. However, researchers stated that: “the expansion of agrifood 
fair trade certification into waged labor [plantations] has not been driven by labor unions or other 
movement groups, but primarily by the demands of retailers” (Jaffee 2012, p. 108). 
Corporate actors finally wanted to be able to purchase Fair Trade products without any 
minimum purchase level. In its first year of partnership with Fair Trade, Starbucks purchased less than 1 
percent of its coffee from Fair Trade sellers (Jaffee 2012, p. 106). Another Fair Trade corporate partner, 
Nestle’s Fair Trade coffee purchases represented only .0025 percent of its overall coffee supply in 2008 
(Jaffee 2012, p. 106). Though these companies promote their reputations as supporters of Fair Trade, 
they have shown only a minimal commitment to purchasing actual Fair Trade products. 
Figure 2 shows the Fair Trade standards that have been controversial to either activists or 
corporations. Column 1 states the controversial aspect of the standard, column 2 states in which 
standard the controversial aspect is documented, column 3 states the basis for the standards inclusion, 
column 4 states complaints with the standard and columns 5 & 6 state whether the controversial 
standard was more beneficial to activists or corporations. 
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Figure 2: Fair Trade USA Controversial Standards 
Controversial 
Aspect 
Appears in 
Standard 
Basis for 
Inclusion 
Complaints Beneficial for 
Activists 
Beneficial for 
Corporations 
Level of Fair 
Trade 
Minimum 
Prices 
Set by Fair 
Trade USA and 
published in 
their database. 
They also 
accept pricing 
defined by 
FLO. 
To empower 
small 
commodity 
farmers who 
face 
fluctuating, 
low 
commodity 
prices. A 
premium was 
included in 
addition to be 
used for 
community 
development 
projects. 
Minimum 
prices have 
only risen 
minimally since 
1989; many 
coffee farmers 
were losing 
money with 
stagnant prices 
and rising 
costs. Real Fair 
Trade coffee 
prices fell by 
39% between 
1988 and 2005 
(Jaffee 2010, p. 
276).  
No Yes 
Certification of 
Plantations 
Farm Workers 
standards 
To increase 
certification to 
products 
produced 
under 
plantation or 
similar 
conditions and 
to spread 
benefits of Fair 
Trade to farm 
workers. 
It goes against 
the original 
goal of Fair 
Trade to 
empower small 
producers by 
licensing large 
plantation 
farms that are 
typical of 
conventional 
agriculture. 
No Yes 
Minimum 
Entry 
Requirements 
Not included in 
standards. 
Initially, there 
were 
negotiations 
within 
Transfair USA 
over a 
minimum 
purchase level 
to use the Fair 
Trade seal 
(Jaffee 2010, p 
274). 
Many large 
corporations 
are purchasing 
Fair Trade 
products at 
very minimal 
levels. 
No Yes 
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a. Level of Fair Trade Minimum Prices 
As stated before, the Fair Trade price is determined by Fair Trade USA and published in their 
database. Some prices used by Fair Trade USA are determined by Fairtrade International (FLO) (Fair 
Trade Standards, Fair Trade USA). Given that coffee is the most prolific and prominent fair trade 
product, I assume that it’s pricing level (compared to the world price) is generally representative of 
prices for all Fair Trade commodities. 
According to Fair Trade USA’s pricing database, the price as of March 201111 for Arabica coffee is 
$1.40/lb., with an additional $0.20 pricing premium for standard coffee and an additional $0.30 pricing 
premium for certified Organic coffee (Pricing Database, Fair Trade USA). The world price of conventional 
coffee at this time was $2.24/lb. as recorded by the International Coffee Organization (ICO Indicator 
Prices). Therefore, the most recent given Fair Trade price was $0.84/lb. lower than the price for 
conventional coffee. In this situation, buyers of Fair Trade coffee pay the conventional price to farmers 
plus the Fair Trade premium which is added to the conventional price. 
These fair trade prices are controversial for several reasons. While the fair trade price initially 
set in 1988 by Max Havelaar was “based on assessments of producers’ costs and livelihood needs”, the 
prices have now become based primarily on negotiations between corporations and activists (Jaffee 
2010, p. 276). As a result, studies of Fair Trade prices over time have shown that “real fair trade coffee 
prices (adjusted for inflation) fell by 39% between 1988 and 2005” (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). In addition, the 
fair trade price would have to increase to $2.29/pound ($0.89 higher than it is currently) to equal the 
purchasing power of the original price set in 1988 (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). Thus, fair trade prices have 
shifted from being based on production and living costs to negotiations between industry and activists 
                                                             
11 The most current price provided by the pricing database on Fair Trade USA’s website: 
http://www.fairtradeusa.org/certification/standards  
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and “no longer provides a living wage [for farmers]” (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). Figure 3 shows a graph of the 
nominal prices of conventional and Fair Trade Arabica coffee from 1989 to 2010 (Fairtrade Foundation). 
Figure 3: Arabica Coffee Fair Trade and World Prices 1989-2010 
 
Since Fair Trade prices have declined in real terms over time, they have only been significantly 
higher than conventional prices when conventional prices are very low. In a study documenting the 
prices received by Fair Trade cooperatives, it notes: “during 2000-2004, when the international coffee 
prices were low [‘the coffee crisis’; prices were extremely low compared to previous years], the Fair 
Trade minimum price increased prices substantially for those cooperatives that were able to sell to Fair 
Trade markets [because it was much higher than the world price], but during 2005-2008, the Fair Trade 
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minimum price has been within the volatility of market prices, and thus has had less significance for 
producer organizations [the FT price has been within the range of the world prices]” (Valkila 2010, p. 
262). Other research confirms this idea saying: “in 2001-2004 […] the economic benefits of Fairtrade 
certification were significant. However, with high prices in the coffee market producers could often get 
the same price in the conventional market as in the Fairtrade market” (Myhr 2011, p. 2). Thus, with the 
exception of 2000-2004 (the period of the coffee crisis), the Fair Trade price has been within the range 
of the conventional price meaning that farmers have only received significantly higher wages from Fair 
Trade when the world coffee price has been low (Valkila & Nygren 2010, p. 326). Since cooperatives also 
have to pay licensing fees to be Fair Trade certified, a fair trade price similar to the conventional price 
does not to “cover the costs of sustainable production” any more than conventional prices, and thus 
does not represent the original main goal of Fair Trade (Myhr 2011, p. 6). 
As well as the price itself, the price premium has become controversial. Since the current Fair 
Trade price is lower than the price of conventional coffee, the added price premium does not serve as 
an additional bonus to the fair trade price but rather as the only difference between the conventional 
and fair trade price. As representatives from Just Coffee state: “The idea with the ‘premium’ is that it 
should be ‘extra’ cash left over after producers are paid for the value of their coffee and labor, to be 
invested in community infrastructure […] in order for these ‘premiums’ to work, we have to assume that 
growers are making money beyond the cash they need for basic survival. We have heard from farmers 
that this is not always the case” (Jaffee 2010, p. 276). Therefore, the price premium cannot be invested 
in projects to help the community as originally intended unless the fair trade minimum price is higher 
than the world price. 
Jaffe 41 
 
b. Certification of Plantations 
Fair Trade was originally intended to certify groups of small farmers or producers that were 
“small-scale and organized into democratic associations” and was “designed as a system explicitly for 
the benefit of small farmers” (Valkila & Nygren 2010, p. 322; Jaffee 2010, p. 277). Seen as the most 
marginalized and powerless within international markets, small producers were encouraged to join or 
form cooperatives of other small farmers to give them more collective bargaining power, to allow for 
democratic decision making, and to become certified as Fair Trade. However, as the Fair Trade label 
expanded to more products, it was unable to cover many products that were produced exclusively in 
plantation or other more conventional styles of production such as tea and bananas (Jaffee 2012, p. 
108). Fair Trade USA CEO Paul Rice noted in 2008: “The disadvantaged majority would be locked out of 
the market if I were to look for only small farms for bananas and tea” (Jaffee 2010, p. 278). Thus, Fair 
Trade expanded its certification of products to some plantation-produced products so that the initiative 
could cover more products. 
Fair Trade’s standards for plantations are part of their farm workers standards (rather than small 
producers organizations standards for cooperatives) and typically ensure that, “employers must pay 
national minimum wages, workers have the right to organize (but the presence of independent unions is 
not required), and fair trade premiums are placed in a fund to be administered by a management-labor 
“joint body” for projects benefitting workers” (Jaffee 2012, p. 108). However, critics have contended 
that national minimum wages are often very low, “the ‘independent’ worker-management organizations 
have an uneven track record at best, and there is no requirement of unionization” (Jaffee 2010, p. 277). 
Plantation certification within Fair Trade is also controversial because it “opens the door to the 
most socially and environmentally problematic forms of conventional agriculture, and can give the fair 
trade imprimatur to corporate ‘bad actors’ with deeply problematic histories of labor rights violations” 
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(Jaffee 2010, p. 277). In addition, small producer cooperatives protested the inclusion of plantation 
certification because their market power is limited by the certification of large, plantation operations 
with lower costs and higher quantities of production (Jaffee 2010, p. 277).  
In response to the protests of small producers, Fairtrade International (FLO), agreed to “keep 
four commodities free of plantation certification for the present: coffee, cocoa, honey, and cotton” 
(Jaffee 2010, p. 277). While the verdict by the FLO was a victory for small producers, Fair Trade USA12 
rejected the decision and left FLO in 2011 so that it could certify any plantation-produced products 
(Jaffee 2012, p. 109). In response to this action, Francisco VanDerhoff Boersma, co-founder of Max 
Havelaar and the Union of Indigenous Communities of the Region of Isthmus, stated that: “Fair Trade 
USA is putting small producer organizations’ […] in direct danger, initiating the certification of private 
plantations and allowing the certification of small unorganized producers […] for that reason, we deeply 
regret that Fair Trade USA has definitively turned its back on the Fair Trade movement’s original 
principals” (Small Farmers Big Change). 
c. Minimum Entry Requirements 
While partnerships with corporate actors have increased the quantity and visibility of Fair Trade 
products, the minimum participation level for corporations to become a Fair Trade licensee has been 
controversial. In initial negotiations over a minimum participation level, activists recommended that for 
a company to be able to use the Fair Trade seal it should purchase at the minimum 5% of its total 
purchases as Fair Trade products (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). As an Equal Exchange representative notes: “this 
would help ensure long term commitments, and not merely token participation” (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). 
However, recognizing real world constraints of business, activists suggested that bigger companies 
would be able to use the Fair Trade level at lower percentage levels (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). Nonetheless, 
                                                             
12 At the time, Fair Trade USA was Transfair USA and still a part of FLO. 
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activists argued that the 5% purchase level should be the absolute minimum for all companies and that 
the minimum purchase level should gradually increase over time to avoid setting the bar too low and 
risk hurting the standard. While activists assumed that their views were shared by Fair Trade USA13, 
“what happened in practice seems to be that Transfair simply encourages companies to work toward 
5%” (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). 
Jaffee 2010a notes that Starbucks started purchasing Fair Trade coffee at about 1% of its total 
purchases and other corporations such as Procter & Gamble and Sara Lee started purchasing less than 
1% of their total purchases as Fair Trade (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). Purchasing low amounts of Fair Trade 
products allows corporations to engage in “fair-washing” or using Fair Trade to bolster their ethical 
image without fully committing to the Fair Trade movement (Jaffee 2010, p. 274). Low Fair Trade 
purchase levels for corporations could also hurt smaller sellers of Fair Trade products who are unable to 
subsidize the costs of Fair Trade in the same way that corporate actors can (Jaffee 2010, p. 275). 
d. Discussion 
The analysis of the controversial standards within Fair Trade shows that the Fair Trade 
regulatory body has effectively become controlled and used as a tool by corporate actors. Activists, 
fighting to preserve the initial mission and scope of Fair Trade, have fought to change the same 
aforementioned standards within Fair Trade for several years. However, as the initiative has developed, 
it has become more controlled by corporate actors, shown by its departure from FLO in 2011 for the 
unlimited certification of plantations and the creation of additional Fair Trade labels (i.e. Fair for Life) 
that are more in line with activists values. Without adequate representation within the Fair Trade USA 
regulatory board, activists have been unable to turn their values into policy and instead see Fair Trade 
USA primarily serve the interests of corporate actors. 
                                                             
13 At this time Fair Trade USA was Transfair USA. 
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If Bernstein’s theory of the Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions were to apply to Fair Trade, it 
would have gone through an evolutionary process from its creation to its capture by industry. Fair Trade 
would have formed around significant public agitation about conventional agricultural production or low 
commodity prices. After regulatory bodies were formed, they would be aggressive in their attempts to 
regulate, but would be limited by a lack of power and organizational support. Eventually, they would 
simply regulate disputes within industry and become a tool of industry, rather than an independent 
body with effective regulatory power. 
The analysis of Fair Trade shows that it has not gone through an evolutionary process similar to 
that discussed in the theory of the Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions. While it was formed around 
agitation about low commodity prices, Fair Trade USA14 was initially more effective in its ability to 
regulate, shown by its initial higher Fair Price in real terms, and its initial limit of the initiative to certify 
small producer cooperatives. Fair Trade USA15 initially was also part of FLO, meaning it had more 
organizational support and legitimacy than it currently has after its departure from the most recognized 
international fair trade system. Clearly, Fair Trade does not represent capture of a regulatory body 
through the process described by Bernstein. 
If Meier’s theory of Regulatory Capture were to apply to Fair Trade, it would have started as a 
regulatory body with limited power, especially compared to interest groups of corporate actors. As a 
result, it would be limited in its ability to regulate and eventually would come to be influenced by 
corporate actors to accommodate their needs. Finally, it would be rendered unable to fight the interest 
groups of corporate and industry actors, and would regulate in the interest of corporations rather than 
in the public interest. 
                                                             
14 Initially, Fair Trade USA was Transfair USA. 
15 Initially, Fair Trade USA was Transfair USA. 
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The analysis of Fair Trade shows that it has become captured by industry as Meier 
demonstrates. When Fair Trade first partnered with corporate actors, it clearly had little ability to 
influence policies of corporate actors. Fair Trade was unable to require corporate actors to purchase a 
set minimum level of Fair Trade coffee, shown through Starbucks initial partnership in which it 
purchased about 1% of its total coffee volume as Fair Trade and declared itself an ethical purchaser 
(Jaffee 2010, p. 274). In the following years, Fair Trade created new partnerships with corporate actors 
who purchased Fair Trade coffee at the same rate or lower as Starbucks. 
The fair price that was the main reason for the movement’s creation shows signs of capture as it 
has fallen dramatically in real terms since the movement’s inception and negotiations over its level now 
reflect: “the prevailing balance of power between different groups of participants in the coalition” 
(Jaffee 2010, p. 276). As a result, the current Fair Trade price is $0.84 lower than the conventional price 
for coffee. 
Finally, Fair Trade has shown that it now regulates in the interests of corporate actors in its 
decision to include plantation certification for essential commodities (i.e. coffee). Although FLO agreed 
to, “keep four commodities free of plantation certification for the present: coffee, cocoa, honey, and 
cotton”, Fair Trade USA left FLO in 2011 so that it could certify any plantation-produced product (Jaffee 
2010, p. 277). As FLO was the most recognized international Fair Trade Organization, Fair Trade USA 
clearly showed that it had been captured in its decision to leave FLO. Additionally, activists created a 
new fair trade label (Fair for Life), that is now more used among small, ethically-conscious companies. 
Rather than regulating in the interests of activists who started the movement, Fair Trade has 
shown a clear shift towards being regulated for the interests of corporate actors. Unable to effectively 
influence policy, activists are seeing Fair Trade stray further from the original values in which it was 
based towards the values of corporate and industry actors. 
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V. Organic: Controversial Standards and Analysis 
The Organic movement started with farmers in the United States who believed that 
conventional agriculture was too industrialized, used too many synthetic agrochemicals and was not 
sustainable in its use of farmlands. These farmers wanted to work with the land in a way that would 
“replicate natural ecosystems” (Guthman 1998, p. 135). In this sense, early pioneers of the Organic 
movement all had different ways of working with the land in more sustainable, ecologically friendly 
ways. These different farmers all shared some common beliefs of farming including, “Composting, 
covercropping, the use of animal and green manures, of permaculture […] together with avoidance of 
synthetic, and often botanical poisons” (DeLind 2000, p. 198). 
The most prominent value of early Organic production was the “absence of chemical residues” 
in agricultural production (DeLind 2000, p. 198). Seen as harmful to both the environment and to human 
health, the use of agrochemicals also represented the typical industrial farm’s drive for cost efficiency 
over product quality. Organic farmers wished to forgo the use of pesticides and turn to more natural 
alternatives. 
Early Organic proponents also valued and advocated for more ecological and ethical treatment 
of animals. Rather than advocating the use of Confined Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) common in 
industrial agricultural production, Organic farmers let their animals graze on open pasture and refused 
to use antibiotics on their animals. 
Finally, early Organic farmers were against the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
and nanotechnology. Although it is generally unknown what effects these substances have on human 
health, Organic farmers that wished for more natural forms of production had no interest in the use of 
either substance. 
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However, corporations saw Organic farming as a way to access higher profits for specialty 
products. Since Organic production used less chemicals and industrial production techniques, its 
products sold for higher prices than conventional agricultural products. Corporations thus wanted to use 
the Organic seal to attract environmentally conscious consumers without significantly raising the costs 
of their production and thus, “the essential motivation for this participation remains the goal of profit 
rather than a commitment to the ideals that originally shaped the development of agrifood alternatives” 
(Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 389). 
Corporations wanted to be able to use the Organic seal on products that were produced under 
low-cost means similar to conventional agricultural products. This meant they wanted to be able to use 
chemicals and pesticides to lower their costs of production. When discussing the NOSB and the National 
List, Strom notes that: “As corporate membership on the board increased, so, too, has the number of 
nonorganic materials approved for organic foods on what is called the National List […] Today, more 
than 250 nonorganic substances are on the list, up from 77 in 2002” (Strom 2012, p. 3). 
They also wanted to use other aspects of conventional production such as irradiation, sewage 
sludge and GMOs in Organic production. When irradiation, sewage sludge, and GMOs appeared in the 
USDA’s proposed rule for Organic against the NOSB’s recommendations, “the proposed rule […] was 
criticized for lowering (or altering) NOSB-derived standards to accommodate the needs of large-scale 
growers and processors” (DeLind 2000, p. 201). Thus, the inclusion of irradiation, sewage sludge, and 
GMOs to the proposed rule for organic was explicitly for the benefit of corporate actors. 
Finally, corporations sought to use the Organic seal on animal products and farms that 
resembled conventional, large-scale farms. This meant they wanted to be able to give animals 
antibiotics and limited space for grazing (similar to in large CAFOs), shown by “evidence that organic 
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farms are increasing in scale and using more capital intensive inputs and production techniques” (Jaffee 
& Howard 2010, p. 391). 
Figure 4 shows the USDA Organic standards that have been controversial to either activists or 
corporations. Column one states the controversial aspect of the standard, column two states in what 
standard the controversial aspect is documented, column three states the basis for the standards 
inclusion, column four states complaints with the standard and columns five and six state whether the 
controversial standard was more beneficial to activists or corporations. 
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Figure 4: USDA Organic Controversial Standards 
Controversial 
Aspect 
Appears in 
Standard 
Basis for 
Inclusion 
Complaints Beneficial 
for 
Activists 
Beneficial for 
Corporations 
Irradiation, 
Sewage Sludge, 
GMOs 
Removed All were 
included 
because they 
were typical 
features of 
conventional 
production. 
All these three 
were seen as 
conflicting with 
the ideals of 
organic and were 
not included in 
the original NOSB 
proposal sent to 
the USDA. 
Initially 
No; After 
Final 
Ruling Yes 
Initially Yes; 
After Final 
Ruling No 
Definition of 
animal access to 
pasture 
Access to Pasture 
Final Rule 
National organic 
standards were 
designed to 
ensure that 
pasture animals 
received 
adequate access 
to pasture so 
that they could 
consume a 
minimum 
amount of 
natural grasses 
(Access to 
Pasture). 
The previous 
requirements 
were vague and 
allowed large 
agricultural 
producers to 
deny their 
animals adequate 
access to pasture. 
Yes No 
Definition of 
allowable inputs 
Included in 
“National List of 
Allowed and 
Prohibited 
Substances” 
(National Organic 
Program). 
Included so that 
production of 
organic 
products can be 
facilitated with 
the use of 
additional 
inputs. 
Consumers and 
activists saw the 
inclusion of 
synthetic and 
chemical inputs 
as contrary to the 
original goals of 
the organic 
movement. 
Yes 
(partially) 
Yes 
(partially) 
Extension to 
other products 
The NOSB passed 
a 
recommendation 
in 2009 for 
"Solving the 
Problem of 
Mislabeled 
Organic Personal 
Care Products” to 
create a standard 
To allow 
producers of 
non-agricultural 
products to use 
the Organic seal 
on products 
produced with 
Organic 
ingredients. 
Manufacturers 
were using the 
“organic” label on 
products that had 
not been verified 
as produced with 
only organic 
ingredients. 
Yes 
(Partially) 
Yes 
(Partially) 
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for Organic 
Personal Care 
Products (Solving 
the Problem of 
Mislabeled 
Organic Care 
Products). 
Use of 
Nanotechnology 
Appears in 
“Guidance 
Document – 
Engineered 
Nanomaterials in 
Organic 
Production, 
Processing and 
Packaging” 
published by the 
NOSB in 2010 
(Guidance 
Document -
Engineered 
Nanomaterials). 
Nanotechnology 
is used in the 
production of 
many foods to 
reduce fat 
content, add 
flavor, and to 
increase the 
“shelf life” of 
many products 
(Out of the 
Laboratory and 
On To Our 
Plates). 
Research 
suggests that 
exposure to 
nanoparticles 
through 
production and 
consumption 
could damage our 
cells’ nuclei which 
could in turn 
cause 
“granulomas, 
lesions, cancer or 
blood clots” (Out 
of the Laboratory 
and On To Our 
Plates).  
Yes 
(Partially) 
Yes 
(Partially) 
 
a. Irradiation, Sewage Sludge & GMOs 
After the NOSB submitted its initial recommendation for Organic standards to the USDA, the 
USDA published its proposed rule for Organic in 1997 (DeLind 2000, p. 199). While the NOSB spent four 
years creating its recommendations, the USDA spurred many of the NOSB’s concerns by including in its 
proposed rule: “the acceptance of food irradiation for controlling spoilage and bacterial contamination, 
sewage sludge as a soil amendment, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs)” (DeLind 2000, p. 199). 
These three items represented some of the more controversial aspects of conventional production and 
created an immediate backlash from activists. 
Irradiation is used as a technique to extend the shelf-life of foods by killing bacteria and 
microbes (Irradiation and Food Safety). Food irradiation is conducted using: “high-energy Gamma rays, 
electron beams, or X-rays [to] break apart the bacteria and insects that can hide in meat, grains, and 
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other foods” (Food Safety Fact Sheet). Approved by the FDA in 1963, it is typically used in the production 
of meats and raw produce (Irradiation and Food Safety). However, food irradiation has been shown to 
affect the taste of foods, lower vitamin content, and create “chemicals known or suspected to cause 
cancer and birth defects” (Food Safety Fact Sheet). 
Sewage sludge became used in agricultural production after the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 
1988 prohibited it from being dumped in the ocean as it had previously (Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 
1988; Sludge News). Rather than dumping it in the ocean, farmers were encouraged to use sewage 
sludge as a makeshift form of compost. While sewage sludge’s use in agricultural production was 
justified by equivocating it to a natural fertilizer, it has been shown that sewage sludge can contain 
“hundreds of dangerous pathogens, toxic heavy metals, flame-retardants, endocrine disruptors, 
carcinogens, pharmaceutical drugs, and other hazardous chemicals” (OCA Sludge Leaflet). 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been developed to increase crop yields, make 
crops more durable to climate and disease, reduce pesticide use, increase nutrient content, and increase 
agricultural production (Genetically Modified Foods and Organisms). However, GMOs have been 
controversial in that their effects on humans and the environment are not well established. Also, they 
can be toxic or allergenic, and they increase rather than decrease pesticide use (GMO Myths and 
Truths). 
As all three of the previously mentioned additions indicate (irradiation, sewage sludge and 
GMOs), their inclusion in the initial draft of the National Organic Program was very controversial for 
organic activists. All three additions represented environmentally destructive methods of production, 
and shared no resemblance to the natural, sustainable production techniques that activists had 
originally advocated as organic. Former NOSB member Joan Gussow shared this sentiment, noting that: 
“organic agriculture is being defined, its definition being rendered serviceable to an existing agrifood 
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industry” (DeLind 2000, p. 199). In response, activists and consumer advocate groups mobilized a public 
campaign of more than 275,000 consumers against the addition of irradiation, sewage sludge, and 
GMOs to the Organic standards (Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 390). In the face of intense public pressure, 
the USDA excluded irradiation, sewage sludge, and GMOs from its final draft16 published in 2002 (Jaffee 
& Howard 2010, p. 390). While clearly a win for activists who wanted the previously mentioned 
additions removed from Organic standards, the fight over what to include in the rule may have hurt the 
organic movement overall by: “focusing attention on allowable inputs, to the exclusion of other goals” 
(Jaffee & Howard 2010, p. 390). 
b. Definition of Animal Access to Pasture 
The 2002 Final Rule for Organic recommended but did not require access to pasture for grazing 
animals (Behind the Organic Pasture Rule at the USDA). Due to the vague language of the 2002 rule and 
a lack of pressure from the USDA, many animal producers were certifying their products as organic even 
if their animals were raised in close confinement in conventional operations similar to CAFOs, without 
access to pasture (Behind the Organic Pasture Rule at the USDA). The lack of pressure from the USDA to 
provide adequate grazing time was likely because in a conventional, confined operation dairy (very 
limited access to pasture), cows produce more milk as they do not expend energy walking in and out of 
pasture (Behind the Organic Pasture Rule at the USDA). 
After more than 80,000 public comments protesting the initial access to pasture rule in the NOP, 
the NOSB submitted a new access to pasture rule that was published by the NOP in 2010. Specifically 
addressing public complaints, the new access to pasture rule required animal and dairy producers to: 
“provide year-round access for all animals to the outdoors, recognize pasture as a crop, establish a 
functioning management plan for pasture, incorporate the pasture management plan into their organic 
                                                             
16 The Final Draft of 2002 was the first published rule of USDA Organic. 
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system plan (OSP), provide ruminants [grazing animals] with pasture throughout the grazing season for 
their geographical location, and ensure ruminants derive not less than an average of 30 percent of their 
dry matter intake (DMI) requirement from pasture grazed over the course of the grazing season” (NOP 
Access to Pasture, p. 1). As stated by the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) which oversees the NOP, 
the new access to pasture rule was established: “to ensure that NOP livestock regulations have sufficient 
specificity and clarity to enable AMS and accredited certifying agents to efficiently administer the NOP 
and to facilitate and improve compliance and enforcement [and] to satisfy consumer expectations that 
ruminant livestock animals graze on pastures during the grazing season” (NOP Access to Pasture, p. 4). 
In a clear victory for organic consumers and activists, the NOP removed its vague language in 
defining and enforcing animal access to pasture, replacing it with a concrete rule that established clear 
standards for animal access to pasture. Not only beneficial to organic consumers, this rule helped small 
animal farmers and dairies that had been raising animals with adequate access to pasture but were 
being outcompeted by cheaper, organic products produced by large farms that did not allow their 
animals to graze. 
c. Definition of Allowable Inputs 
Since its creation in 2002, any synthetic or nonorganic materials allowed or restricted within 
Organic production had to be approved by the NOP and published in the National List of Allowed and 
Prohibited Substances (shortened to National List). Any organization or individual may propose a 
synthetic or nonorganic substance to be included to the National List, which is then reviewed and 
recommended to be either published or not included in the National List (National Organic Program). 
Every five years all of the materials on the National List are reviewed by the NOSB, which determines 
whether the materials should stay, be removed or have their listings amended (National Organic 
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Program). The debate about what should and should not be included on the National List has been an 
ongoing fight between activists and industry. 
In 2004, the first controversial attempted additions to the National List were several animal and 
livestock medications. The proposed additions included the medications: “activated charcoal, bismuth 
subsalicylate, butorphanol, calcium borogluconate, calcium propionate, kaolin pectate, magnesium 
hydroxide, magnesium oxide, mineral oil and potassium sorbate” (Concerning Livestock 
Recommendations). These medications, like many used by conventional livestock producers, were not 
technically approved by the FDA but were: “allowed under FDA’s regulatory discretion” (Concerning 
Livestock Recommendations). After being petitioned to include these medications on the National List, 
the NOSB approved the addition of these livestock medications to the National List. The NOSB approved 
these medications even though, as activists state: “if implemented, they would allow a host of new 
synthetic materials into organic production without review and [would] facilitate the recycling of dairy 
animals between organic and conventional operations” (OCA’s Ongoing Campaign to Safeguard Organic 
Standards). 
While approved by the NOSB, the NOP notified the NOSB that: “livestock medications which are 
not formally approved by the FDA, cannot be placed on the National List” (Concerning Livestock 
Recommendations). Thus, in a victory for activists, these livestock medications were not added to the 
National List. However, the NOSB has been active in pursuing other ways of including these livestock 
medications in the National List without disregarding FDA regulations, foreshadowing possible future 
controversies. 
d. Extension to Other Products 
In August 2005, the USDA announced that it had “extended the USDA regulations to cover the 
organic claims made by personal care products which meet the composition requirements for organic 
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food” (Solving the Problem of Mislabeled Organic Personal Care Products). Still, at this time many 
personal care products were sold as “organic” rather than USDA Organic, confusing consumers and 
casting questions on their organic legitimacy (Solving the Problem of Mislabeled Organic Personal Care 
Products). Following the 2005 regulations, the USDA still was not actively enforcing the organic claims 
made by many personal care products and as a result: “Consumers are not assured that organic claims 
are consistently reviewed” (Solving the Problem of Mislabeled Organic Personal Care Products). Since 
the USDA Organic label was created specifically to prevent confusion caused by false, misleading organic 
labels, its failure to enforce the organic claims made on personal care products threatened to 
undermine the legitimacy of the USDA Organic label. 
In response to the enforcement failure for personal care products, the NOSB issued a 
recommendation in 2009: “(1) assuring consumers that the federal government is policing organic 
claims on personal care products; (2) allowing for the development of a complete federal organic 
personal care program” (Solving the Problem of Mislabeled Organic Personal Care Products).  This 
recommendation effectively pressured the NOP to make sure that any personal care product made with 
agriculturally produced organic ingredients was actively regulated. In a victory for activists, the NOSB 
prevented the proliferation of misleading “organic” personal care products and clarified its regulations 
and enforcement for organic personal care products. 
e. Use of Nanotechnology 
In 2010, General Mills petitioned the NOP to allow for the use of nanotechnology17 in the 
production of its organic products (OCA’s Ongoing Campaign to Safeguard Organic Standards). 
                                                             
17 Nanotechnology is defined by the NOSB as: “substances deliberately designed, engineered and produced by 
human activity to be in the nanoscale range (approx 1-300 nm) because of very specific properties or compositions 
(eg. shape, surface properties, or chemistry) that result only in that nanoscale. Incidental particles in the nanoscale 
range created during traditional food processing such as homogenization, milling, churning, and freezing, and 
naturally occurring particles in the nanoscale range are not intended to be included in this definition. All 
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Nanotechnology is used in the production of many foods to reduce fat content, add flavor, and to 
increase the “shelf life” of many products (Out of the Laboratory and On To Our Plates). While its effects 
on the human body are still not fully understood, research suggests that exposure to nanoparticles 
could damage human cells’ nuclei, which could cause “granulomas, lesions, cancer or blood clots” (Out 
of the Laboratory and On To Our Plates). In addition, laborers who work with or are exposed to 
nanotechnology on a regular basis face additional risks of these health problems. Also, nanotechnology 
could hurt the environment by altering: “the functioning of nitrogen fixing bacteria associated with 
plants” (Out of the Laboratory and On To Our Plates). 
In response to General Mills’ petition to the NOSB for the inclusion of nanotechnology, activists 
pressured the NOSB to explicitly prohibit the use of nanotechnology in Organic products. In October 
2010, prior to issuing its recommendation, the NOSB first acknowledged, “There is overwhelming 
agreement within the organic industry to prohibit nanotechnology in organic production and processing 
at this time” (Engineered Nanomaterials in Organic Production, Processing and Packaging). While the 
NOSB recommendation discussed the prohibition of nanotechnology in organic production, it also 
acknowledged the additional dangers of contamination from nanoparticles during food production. Still, 
while the 2010 NOSB recommendation argues for the prohibition of nanotechnology in all Organic 
products, it does not explicitly prohibit nanotechnology. It advocates the need for more clarification of 
what qualifies as nanotechnology and more analysis of how nanotechnology is used and affects food 
production. Thus, it recommends to the NOP that nanotechnology should be prohibited from Organic 
production. 
Although the NOP did not explicitly ban nanotechnology from being used in Organic products, 
the 2010 NOSB recommendation is at least a partial victory for activists. The 2010 NOSB 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
nanomaterials (without exception) containing capping reagents or other synthetic components are intended to be 
included in this definition” (Engineered Nanomaterials in Organic Production). 
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recommendation does establish recommended guidelines for the prohibition of nanotechnology and 
acknowledges that it needs to work with the NOP to establish further guidelines to effectively regulate 
production to make sure nanotechnology is not involved or does not contaminate production. 
f. Discussion 
After an analysis of the controversial standards within Organic, it is evident that both corporate 
actors and activists have both won and lost in the fight over controversial standards. After the initial 
inclusion of irradiation, sewage sludge and GMOs in the 2002 proposed rule for Organic, a massive 
activist campaign caused them to be removed from the final rule in a clear victory for activists. However, 
since this initial fight, battles over controversial standards have become more complex and have often 
ruled in favor of both parties. 
Thus the analysis of the controversial standards within the Organic label shows that the Organic 
label has not been controlled by activists or corporations, but instead represents the values of both 
parties. As the NOSB is a public regulatory body, its membership has to compose of a diverse group of 
stakeholders. It appears that this diverse group of stakeholders is much more effective in creating 
standards that benefit both parties than the less diverse group that regulate Fair Trade. 
Still, it is clear that many controversial aspects of the Organic program are still being debated 
between activists and corporations (i.e. final recommendations on nanotechnology, additions to 
National List). While the program may never completely resolve many of the fights between activists 
and corporations, it has benefitted both parties to a certain extent and shows that it represents the 
wishes of a diverse group of stakeholders. 
If Bernstein’s theory of the Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions were to apply to Organic, it 
would have gone through an evolutionary process from its creation to its capture by industry. Organic 
would have formed around significant public distress about conventional agricultural production or low 
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commodity prices. After regulatory bodies were formed, they would be aggressive in their attempts to 
regulate, but would be limited by a lack of power and organizational support. Eventually, they would 
simply regulate disputes within industry and become a tool of industry, rather than an independent 
body with effective regulatory power. 
Clearly, the Organic program has not gone through the evolutionary process described by 
Bernstein and has not been captured by industry. While Organic did form about public distress about 
conventional agricultural production, it has had increasing organizational support since its creation. 
After the proposed rule included irradiation, sewage sludge and GMOs, a massive activist campaign 
drafted popular public support and pressured the USDA to remove the three aforementioned items 
from the final rule for Organic. Since then, public pressure on the NOP to maintain legitimate Organic 
standards has become even more intense, shown through constant campaigns by activist organizations 
such as the Organic Consumer’s Association (OCA’s Ongoing Campaign to Safeguard Organic Standards). 
Finally, the NOSB has not become simply a tool of industry to be used for its benefit, showing that 
Organic has not been captured as Bernstein describes. 
If Meier’s theory of Regulatory Capture were to apply to Organic, it would have started as a 
regulatory body with limited power, especially compared to interest groups of corporate actors. As a 
result, it would be limited in its ability to regulate and eventually would come to be influenced by 
corporate actors to accommodate their needs. Finally, it would be rendered unable to fight the interest 
groups of corporate and industry actors, and would regulate in the interest of corporations rather than 
in the public interest. 
Meier’s theory of Regulatory Capture thus does not apply to Organic. Although the NOSB may 
have initially had limited power in comparison to corporate actors, other interest groups (i.e. Consumer 
Unions) were able to influence policy to remove irradiation, sewage sludge and GMOs from the final rule 
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of Organic. Over time, the NOSB has actually become more effective in its ability to regulate industry 
actors, shown through the passage of the new animal access to pasture rule, the additional clarification 
over the certification of personal care products, the rejection of many controversial substances to the 
National List and recommendations against the inclusions of nanotechnology to Organic. Clearly, the 
NOSB has not been captured by industry, but actually more effective in its ability to regulate disputes 
between activists and corporate actors. 
VI. Conclusion 
After an analysis of controversial standards within Fair Trade and Organic, it is clear that some 
insight can be gained from this comparison of public and private regulatory bodies. Each regulatory body 
was designed to create standards that represented original values of each initiative without diluting the 
original goals of the movement. At the same time, each regulatory body also had to design standards 
reasonable enough that corporate and industry actors would want to use the label on their products. 
Fair Trade USA and the NOSB worked in this way, to create legitimate standards for each 
initiative. However, since Fair Trade USA became regulated privately while the NOSB became regulated 
publicly, the different nature of each regulatory body caused them to work differently in response to 
pressures from corporations. The NOSB was regulated by a group of stakeholders that legally had to be 
derived from diverse groups of activists and corporate actors. Fair Trade USA was regulated privately 
and had no legal guidelines in how to construct its regulatory body. 
While Jaffee & Howard 2010 argued that Organic showed more signs of capture than Fair Trade, 
this analysis concludes the opposite. After an analysis of controversial standards within each initiative, it 
is clear that public regulatory bodies such as the NOSB are much more effective in representing diverse 
groups of industry and activists, drafting proposals and recommendations that are more representative 
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of diverse stakeholders and creating legislation that is more transparent and available for comment and 
consideration. In contrast, the private regulatory group within Fair Trade USA represents fewer diverse 
stakeholders, drafts proposals that are more representative of corporate stakeholders, and creates 
legislation that is often not very transparent. As Fair Trade’s standards have become more tailored to 
the interest of corporations, the movement has become less focused on the interests of small farmers 
and their benefits have reduced as a result. While Fair Trade is still a positive movement for workers in 
the south, its ability to help out small farmers is limited by corporations who are more concerned about 
profit than social justice. In this way, Fair Trade USA has effectively been captured by corporate actors 
and is being used for their own benefit. 
For Fair Trade USA to become a more legitimate regulatory body that represents both activists 
and industry, it should be publicly regulated within the USDA. While public regulation has problems 
related to aspects not mentioned in this paper18, it could create a regulatory program for Fair Trade that 
legally has to represent diverse groups of stakeholders in its regulatory board. Public regulation for Fair 
Trade could eliminate the multiple Fair Trade labels present within the US (i.e. Fair Trade USA & Fair for 
Life), reducing the confusion caused by multiple labeling certifications and creating a more streamlined, 
understandable definition of Fair Trade. Public regulation for Fair Trade would also make any documents 
drafted or published during the regulatory process publicly available, creating more transparency and 
clear direction of what the initiative is trying to achieve. Thus public regulation would create a clearer 
public understanding of the Fair Trade label and would be more effective in representing the values and 
goals of diverse stakeholders. 
While my analysis proves that Fair Trade has been captured by corporate actors, my data was 
limited by several factors. Because I only focused on controversial standards within each movement, I 
                                                             
18
 One problem not mentioned earlier in the paper because of its lack of relevance is the lack of accrediting agents 
within the USDA (Barker 2010). This may result in the inability of the USDA to effectively regulate all aspects of 
Organic production (Barker 2010). 
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did not analyze any other facets of the initiatives. Thus, I did not intend to write a critique of either 
initiative, rather I only analyzed if the initiatives showed signs of capture through their initiative’s 
standards. In addition, since I only focused on controversial standards within each initiative, it is possible 
that there are other aspects of each initiative that could show more evidence of capture by corporate 
actors or unrealistic demands by activists. Still this analysis provides additional content and elaborates 
on the discussion of corporate capture of Fair Trade and Organic began by Jaffee & Howard 2010. 
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